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I. INTRODUCTION
A landowner may file a “class of one” equal protection claim when he or she
believes that local government decision-making has denied him or her equal
protection of the law. 1 In most states, courts require a landowner to prove that the
government, without a rational basis, treated him or her differently from other
landowners in a near identical situation.2 This “similarly situated test” furthers a
strong policy to protect governments that exercise proper discretion. 3 However, it
is illogical to require a landowner, who is singled out by obvious government
animus, to indicate disparate treatment of another landowner in near identity. 4
Such a requirement shields a government’s improper use of discretion by placing
too steep a burden on plaintiffs who would otherwise have a permissible claim
under the Equal Protection Clause. 5 Therefore, courts should adopt an operable
test that will relax the similarly situated test for plaintiffs when the motivation for
the government actor’s decision includes showings of animosity. 6
Dibbs v. Hillsborough County exemplifies the shortfalls of the current test. 7
In Dibbs, Hillsborough County adopted a Community Plan to guide residential
development in the northwestern part of the Keystone-Odessa area with the goal
of maintaining the region’s rural character.8 Dibbs contended that the County’s
repeated frustration of his plans to develop his several properties was not based
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (contrasting a
standard equal protection claim that involves a suspect class from a class of one equal protection claim, where
an individual alleges “that [they alone] have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
[with] no rational basis for the difference in treatment”).
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing the evidentiary burden of a prima facie identical standard in class of
one claims).
3. Pappas v. Town of Enfield, 18 F. Supp. 3d 164, 185 (D. Conn. 2014) (providing examples of a
government exercising proper discretion, such as basing a decision on professional judgement, community
need, or public commentary).
4. See Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (suggesting the requirement is
redundant in an equal protection case).
5. Fenje v. Feld, 398 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2005).
6. Cf. Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (arguing that plaintiffs who are the subject of
deliberate animosity “ought to have a remedy in federal court”).
7. See generally Dibbs v. Hillsborough Cty., 625 F. App’x 515 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2451 (2016).
8. Id. at 516.
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on any rational application of the Keystone Plan, but instead was based on
personal animus toward Mr. Dibbs. 9 Specifically, Dibbs alleged the County
singled him out because of “vindictiveness, maliciousness, animosity, spite or
other reasons unrelated to a legitimate governmental interest.” 10
To show personal animus, Dibbs submitted testimony of the County
Commissioner, who overheard a County reviewer state, “I think we can stop
[Dibbs’s] project by calling sand a mineral.” 11 Dibbs also listed other developers
the County permitted to opt out of similar community plans 12—including one
who received approval to “connect to water and sewer and increase density, the
same as Dibbs.”13 Despite Dibbs’s evidence of the County’s animus against him,
the court dismissed his claim because he could not prove he was intentionally
treated different from a landowner who was permitted to opt out of the Keystone
Plan, specifically. 14
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari
without comment, thereby failing to address how to apply the similarly situated
test in cases of clear government animus. 15 In Part II, this Comment considers the
similarly situated test and its origins, with particular emphasis on the way the
circuit courts have interpreted the test. 16 Part III looks at problems courts face
when the test is given alternative meanings, and the issues that arise when the test
is applied too strictly against the plaintiff. 17 This Comment concludes with Part
IV, which defines the proposed test and applies it to hypothetical scenarios and
examples that will help prove its validity and practicality. 18
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CLASS OF ONE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
In 1995, courts grappled for the first time with questions regarding how they
should consider equal protection rights when a government treats individuals
differently from others who are similarly situated. 19 Courts have used the
9. Dibbs v. Hillsborough Cty., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
10. Dibbs, 625 F. App’x at 518; see also Dibbs, 67 F. Supp. at 1345−46, 1355 (pointing to the County’s
unnecessary delays of his applications over a ten-year period, including a seven month delay of his excavation
permit and a 21 month delay of his approval for a borrow pit. He also claimed the County “disliked” him
personally for having won a prolonged legal battle against the County back in 1997, which served as a
motivation to deny multiple applications to remove his properties from the Keystone Plan).
11. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Dibbs v. Hillsborough Cty., 625 F. App’x 515 (2015) (No. 15-10152),
2016 WL 1056616.
12. Dibbs, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1355.
13. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 9; see also id. at 7 (putting on additional evidence of eleven
other borrow pits, some identical in size to Dibbs’ borrow pit, that were approved in a much shorter time period
than it took to process his approval).
14. Dibbs, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1355.
15. Dibbs, 625 F. App’x 515.
16. See infra Part II (looking at the test’s development under case precedent).
17. See infra Part III (concerning the test’s ambiguity and its effect on plaintiffs).
18. See infra Part IV (putting the proposed test through six hypothetical scenarios or examples).
19. Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995); see generally Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
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similarly situated inquiry in wrongful termination cases to assess the
commonalities between an employee plaintiff and a co-worker “to suggest that
the plaintiff was singled out for worse treatment.” 20 This part is divided into three
sections: the first looks at the evolution of the class of one claim in different
contexts; the second analyzes why courts gravitate towards a strict application of
the similarly situated test in land use cases; and the third considers government
animus and its current role in class of one claims. 21
A. The Beginning of Class of One Equal Protection Claims
The first major case to discuss this class of one issue was Esmail v. Macrane,
where a Naperville mayor sought to deny Esmail’s liquor store licenses
arbitrarily and consistently, while granting licenses to similar or less accredited
store owners in the area.22 Reversing the lower court’s dismissal of Esmail’s
equal protection claim, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found evidence of
more than mere unequal treatment, and held that Esmail’s case should have
survived the pleading stage because the mayor initiated an “orchestrated
campaign of official harassment directed against him out of sheer malice.” 23
Unlike the treatment involved in a nonactionable selective prosecution claim, 24
this treatment resulted from the mayor’s solely vindictive motive. 25 This class of
one theory fits narrowly within the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, and at first required an identification of the government’s motivating
factor in their decision—a condition not seen in typical, group-based equal
protection claims.26
The landmark decision of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech was the first
Supreme Court case to recognize the class of one equal protection claim in the
land use and zoning context. 27 There, the United States Supreme Court upheld
Olech’s equal protection claim when the Village had told Ms. Olech it would
connect her property to the municipal water supply only if she granted the
Village a 33-foot easement on her property. 28 The Village only required other
528 U.S. 562 (2000) (leaving the word similarly situated undefined).
20. MICHAEL J. CONNOLLY & WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY § 3.04, 21 (Law Journal Press 2d ed. 2006).
21. See infra Part II.A, II.B, and II.C, respectively.
22. Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178.
23. Id. at 179.
24. See id. (offering a satirical explanation of claims that would not survive the pleading stage: “If a bad
person is treated better than a good person, this is just as much an example of unequal treatment as when a bad
person is treated better than an equally bad person or a good person worse than an equally good person.”).
25. Id.
26. Benjamin L. Schuster, Fighting Disparate Treatment: Using the “Class of One” Equal Protection
Doctrine in Eminent Domain Settlement Negotiations, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 369, 385 (2010).
27. See generally Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (holding that a “homeowner could
assert equal protection claim as class of one” in the land use and zoning context).
28. Id. at 563.

154

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
neighboring landowners to grant the Village a 15-foot easement. 29 The Court
held this evidence was enough to state a claim under a class of one theory, but
declined to comment on whether “subjective ill will” should be required to
convert an otherwise “run-of-the-mill zoning case” into one that should be
treated as a matter of constitutional protection.30 The lower court in Olech had
departed from the decision in Esmail and definitively held “nothing . . . suggests
a general requirement of ‘orchestration’” in class of one equal protection cases. 31
Since Olech, some courts have traditionally read such a requirement into the
test,32 while other courts have chosen not to. 33
In his Olech concurrence, Justice Breyer famously noted, “zoning decisions
. . . will often, perhaps almost always, treat one landowner differently from
another.”34 Courts have suggested that different treatment of similarly situated
individuals alone will not justify an equal protection claim. 35 Furthermore, courts
share in this overarching fear that too lax a test may strip local governments of
their power and subject their agents to a plethora of personal liability suits. 36
Despite these universally recognized fears, circuits apply the similarly situated
test differently across the United States. 37
Today, a plaintiff must show the following to prevail on a class of one equal
protection claim: (1) that he or she was treated differently than others similarly
situated, and (2) that the government had no rational basis for the disparate
treatment.38 This Comment focuses specifically on the justifications for changing
the similarly situated test, since prong (2) is naturally established in cases of
readily obvious government animus. 39

29. Id.
30. Id. at 565–66 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This case, however, does not directly raise the question
whether the simple and common instance of a faulty zoning decision would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
That is because . . . respondent had alleged an extra factor as well . . . illegitimate animus.”).
31. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
32. Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 476 (Sup. Ct. Utah 2003) (dismissing the developer’s
complaint for failing to state a malicious motive by the city); Terrazas v. Blaine Cty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs,
207 P.3d 169, 181 (Sup. Ct. Idaho 2009) (affirming judgment for the county and finding the developer was not
intentionally singled out).
33. See generally Franklin v. City of Merriam, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34543, at *12 (D. Kan. Apr. 25,
2008); Highland Dev., Inc. v. Duchesne Cty., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1153 (D. Utah 2007) (refusing to
affirmatively adopt animus as a requirement).
34. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565 (Breyer, J., concurring).
35. E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Rossi v. W. Haven Bd. of
Educ., 359 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (2005) (“Decisions that are imprudent, ill-advised, or even incorrect may still
be rational.”).
36. Shaun M. Gehan, With Malice Toward One: Malice and the Substantive Law in “Class of One”
Equal Protection Claims in the Wake of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 54 ME. L. REV. 329, 332–33 (2002).
37. See Schuster, supra note 26 (noting many different applications of the test across the U.S).
38. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.
39. See Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If the power of government is brought to
bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state or local official harbors a malignant animosity
toward him, the individual ought to have a remedy in federal court.”).
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B. Applying the Similarly Situated Test Rigorously in Land Use
The Supreme Court in Olech left the similarly situated test undefined by
failing to address what it means for two landowners to be “similar.”40 Scholars,
such as Robert Farrell, say the Supreme Court did so to allow lower courts more
discretion in deciding how to best apply the similarly situated test. 41 There is,
however, a deeply-rooted sentiment in constitutional law that, in land use, the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause protects persons from
intentional discrimination, “whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or
by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.”42 Because the
similarly situated test is central to the resolution of a class of one dispute, it
follows that many courts would afford the test the same scrutiny as other claims
of discrimination. 43
Accordingly, circuit courts have increasingly applied one definition—prima
facie identical.44 These courts have trended towards a strict interpretation of the
test based in part on a desire to alleviate this fear of constitutionalizing every
dispute involved in land use decisions. 45 This fear is demonstrated by the Olech
case having been cited by over 4,500 published opinions since the case was
decided 15 years ago. 46 Additionally, one study concluded that plaintiffs had
prevailed in 35% of class of one claims since Olech, compared to just 9% of
plaintiffs surveyed in ordinary rational basis cases over a 25 year period. 47 This is
why, when plaintiffs challenge government action involving planning, masterplans, or real estate development, courts are quick to draw sharp distinctions and
their own conclusions regarding the plaintiff and “those alleged to be similarly
situated yet treated differently”—commonly known as a comparator. 48
While Courts apply the same legal standard, variations on the explicit

40. See generally Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (neglecting to define at what point
two landowners are “similar”).
41. Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 78
WASH. L. REV. 367, 412 (2003).
42. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (citing a host of analogous
decisions).
43. McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1009 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The reason that there is a
‘similarly situated’ requirement in the first place is that at their heart, equal protection claims, even ‘class of
one’ claims, are basically claims of discrimination.”).
44. United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d at 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Racine Charter One, Inc. v.
Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d
1189, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007); Prestopnik v. Whelan, 249 F. App’x 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2007); and Jicarilla Apache
Nation v. Rio Arriba Cty., 440 F.3d 1202, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006).
45. See Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1207 (“[T]o avoid constitutionalizing every state regulatory
dispute . . . we are obliged to apply the ‘similarly situated’ requirement with rigor.”).
46. Westlaw search of Olech v. Willowbrook indicates 4,579 citing decisions as of 4/1/2017.
WESTLAW.
47. Farrell, supra note 41, at 416–17.
48. Kevin D. Caton, Class-of-One Equal Protection Claims Based Upon Real Estate Development,
Zoning, and Planning, 68 A.L.R. 6th 229 Art. 1 § 2 (2011).

156

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
language suggest a disagreement on the level of scrutiny courts should afford the
similarly situated test. 49 In the Eleventh Circuit case Campbell v. Rainbow City,
the United States Court of Appeals applied the highest threshold of the similarly
situated test imaginable, holding, “for any development to be similarly situated to
[p]laintiffs’ proposed project, it must be prima facie identical in all relevant
respects.”50 This is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring plaintiffs to show that
similarities between themselves and their comparators are “extremely high.” 51
The Seventh Circuit applied a slight variation on the test in Ajayi v. Aramark
Business Services, holding that a plaintiff employee’s claim failed because she
could not show she was “treated less favorably than” an employee who was
“directly comparable to her in all material respects.”52 On the other hand,
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College is significantly cited for its application
of the test.53 There, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held “[e]xact correlation is
neither likely nor necessary,” and suggested that a prudent person should at least
find a rough equivalence between the comparators.54 In what is likely the weakest
application of the test, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Bench Billboard
Co. v. City of Cincinnati “a court should not demand exact correlation, but should
instead seek ‘relevant similarity.’” 55
These differing interpretations of the similarly situated test demonstrate that
some courts are willing to depart from such a strict application of the rule. 56
Aggrieved plaintiffs are increasingly met with judges that seem to go out of their
way to find distinctions between identified comparators. 57 This is true even
though some circuit courts have found a similarly situated analysis is best

49. See infra Part II.B (providing four case examples of differing levels of scrutiny).
50. Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Racine Charter One, Inc. v.
Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677 (2005)); Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir.
2004) (holding that to be considered “similarly situated,” comparators must be “prima facie identical in all
relevant respects”); McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004) (“It is clear that
similarly situated individuals must be very similar indeed.”).
51. Prestopnik v. Whelan, 249 F. App’x 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[Prima facie identical] requires a
showing that the level of similarity between the plaintiff and the person(s) with whom she compares herself is
“extremely high” - so high (1) that no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ
from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate
government policy, and (2) that the similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to
exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.”).
52. Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., 336 F.3d 520, 531–532 (7th Cir. 2003).
53. Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989) (LEXIS search indicates over
400 citing decisions as of January 8th, 2017).
54. Id.
55. Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 675 F.3d 974, 987 (6th Cir. 2012).
56. See generally id. (illustrating one of the least strict applications of the test yet); see also Rollins v.
Mabus, 627 F. App’x 618, 620 (9th Cir. 2015); Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th
Cir. 2011); Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (construing the similarly situated
requirement to mean similar rather than identical).
57. Michael S. Giaimo, Challenging Improper Land Use Decision-Making Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 335, 348 (2003).
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performed by a jury. 58 A project applicant already faces an uphill-battle in
succeeding on such a strict test because proposed development projects are so
unique in their “location, access to roadways, zoning district[s], topography,
size[,] and previous use.”59 Sharing this sentiment, at least one court has
rationalized that the differing applications of the similarly situated requirement
may depend upon the complexity of the plaintiff’s request:
Governmental decision-making challenged under a “class of one” equal
protection theory must be evaluated in light of the full variety of factors that an
objectively reasonable governmental decision maker would have found relevant
in making the challenged decision. Accordingly, when dissimilar governmental
treatment is not the product of a one-dimensional decision–such as a standard
easement or a tax assessed at a pre-set percentage of market value–the “similarly
situated” requirement will be more difficult to establish. 60
Courts are looking to strike a perfect balance with the similarly situated test
that will afford state actors adequate discretion without disrupting the federal and
state court balance over decisions involving constitutional review. 61
C. Current Role of Animus in Equal Protection Claims
A majority of courts have concluded that government animus or subjective
ill-will is not an express requirement of a class of one equal protection claim, but
is at least some evidence that a claim exists. 62 However, the trend of courts postOlech is to follow the Breyer concurrence and include ill-will as a necessary
requirement of a claim, instead of following the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion.63 For example, cases out of the Second and Seventh Circuits have
dismissed class of one equal protection claims “if the plaintiff cannot [prove] the
government had an illegitimate motive, such as discrimination, retaliation,

58. See Harlen Assocs. v. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (suggesting judges can
exercise their power in summary judgment).
59. Giaimo, supra note 57, at 349; see also McDonald’s Corp. v. City of Norton Shores 102 F. Supp. 2d
431, 438 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (denying applicant for naming comparator restaurants on streets different from his
own project); Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16777, at *24 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 4,
2003) (denying applicant for naming comparators who were approved under a different city council); Swanson
v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2013) (denying applicant for naming comparators without a front
fence, instead of those with both a front fence and a boundary fence).
60. Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203–04 (11th Cir. 2007).
61. See id. at 1203 (“Too broad a definition of similarly situated could subject nearly all state regulatory
decisions to constitutional review in federal court and deny state regulators the critical discretion they need to
effectively perform their duties.”).
62. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (indicating eight justices (absent Breyer) in
their per curiam opinion for the Olech court decided not to include the idea of subjective ill will as a
requirement); see also Giaimo, supra note 57, at 343.
63. David Pettit & Michael Schafler, In a Class of Their Own: Speaking Out at a Land Use Forum May
Be All That a Plaintiff Needs to Do to Establish a “Class Of One” Civil Rights Cause of Action, 26 L.A. LAW.
39, 40 (2004).
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‘malicious intent’ or some other ‘bad faith’ motivation.” 64 These circuits may
require evidence of intentional mistreatment because the second prong of a class
of one equal protection claim, that the government have no rational basis for the
disparate treatment, already affords the government decision-maker great
deference.65
Few courts have applied a weaker similarly situated standard in cases of
readily obvious animus, and have not required plaintiffs to identify exact
disparate treatment in their comparators. 66 To illustrate, Geinosky v. City of
Chicago addressed a situation where it was nearly impossible for the plaintiff to
point out a similarly situated comparator because the government actor’s animus
was so extreme.67 In Geinosky, officers of the Chicago Police Department issued
24 parking citations concerning Geinosky’s Toyota within one year. 68 The factual
record “reveal[ed] a disturbing pattern,” where one officer issued Geinosky 13
tickets alleging parking violations on specific dates at exactly 10:00 p.m. 69 Some
tickets contradicted one another, implying “that the Toyota was in two places
almost at once.”70 Officers issued other tickets to Geinoksy’s Toyota even after
he had sold it. 71 The district court dismissed Geinosky’s class of one claim for
failing to point out a comparator who had also received 24 parking tickets within
one year.72 In its reversal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted
Geinosky’s claim, with no proof of direct motive on the department’s part,
because the sheer volume of tickets and the nature of their dispersal was enough
to conclude animus was present. 73
In the land use context, Swanson v. City of Chetek held that a homeowner
who proves direct evidence of government animus against him needs to show
only that “harassment, yelling, arbitrary denials and frivolous litigation do not
normally follow requests for fence permits” to survive a class of one equal
protection claim.74 Unlike traditional class of one land use claims, these courts do
not seem as concerned that such a ruling would open the floodgates to frivolous
litigation against government actors. 75 The Geinosky court reasoned that claims

64. Giaimo, supra note 57, at 342 (citing Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1080 (2001); Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir.
2001); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2001).
65. See infra Part II.A (listing requirements of satisfying a class of one equal protection claim); see also
Giaimo, supra note 57, at 342–43 (explaining the highly deferential nature of the rational basis inquiry).
66. E.g., Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Geinosky v. City of
Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting plaintiff’s general assertion enough in this instance).
67. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 749.
68. Id. at 745.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 746–47.
73. Id. at 748, 751.
74. Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 785 (7th Cir. 2013).
75. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748 (“We do not credit the city’s assertion that allowing this suit will open the

159

2018 / Similarly Situated Test in Cases of Obvious Government Animus
of this extreme nature are rare, and therefore the discretion law enforcement
officials have when engaging in random law enforcement remains unaffected. 76
Therefore, case examples have shown an increasing role of recognizing animus
in class of one land use claims. 77
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT TESTS
Plaintiffs aggrieved by deliberate animus have difficulty meeting the prima
facie identical standard and other strict variations of the test, especially when
development projects—much like people—are almost never identical. 78 “We are
looking for comparators, not ‘clone[s],’” begs the Seventh Circuit. 79 Further,
plaintiffs cannot foresee what comparisons or distinctions are necessary to satisfy
the test because “the picture [among] circuits is very mixed.” 80
This section addresses why imposing strict standards on plaintiffs who have
suffered readily obvious animus is dangerous. 81 Finally, the unclear “role of
motive or intent” as animus in class of one claims fails to provide better guidance
to plaintiffs or help resolve circuit conflict.82
A. Strict Application of the Similarly Situated Test Eliminates Class of One
Claims
As explained in Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit specifically requires
plaintiffs to identify prima facie identical comparators—a standard so strict that it
is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to meet and calls into question the utility of
class of one claims.83
Whitmore v. Department of Labor considered the Eleventh Circuit’s strict
interpretation in a whistleblower context to determine “what it means for [two]
employees to be ‘similarly situated.’” 84 After 37 years as an OSHA employee,
Robert Whitmore began making public disclosures about OSHA’s failure to

floodgates to a wave of ordinary malicious prosecution (or other tort) cases brought as constitutional class-ofone claims.”).
76. Id. at 748–49.
77. E.g., Swanson, 719 F.3d 780; Geinosky, 675 F.3d 743.
78. See infra Part II.A (discussing Breyer’s view that distinctions between two projects can almost
always be made).
79. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2004) (“Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary.”).
80. Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J., concurring).
81. See infra Part III.A (noting the issues imposed by a strict interpretation of the similarly situated test).
82. Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 900 (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also infra Part III.B (noting how courts
and plaintiffs sometimes struggle with the requirements).
83. See e.g., Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (arguing plaintiff’s
comparators, both of whom sought approval for their developments, were not prima facie identical because only
one sought tentative approval).
84. Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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properly enforce its records. 85 The whistleblowing effort caused tension between
Whitmore and his direct supervisor Joe Dubois, which led to multiple spats and
argumentative altercations. 86 With a seemingly equal display of misconduct from
both sides, the last straw involved an incident resulting in Whitmore’s
termination and Dubois’s protection from discipline. 87
The court evaluated the circumstances of the differential treatment and
Whitmore’s whistleblower defense by applying a similarly situated test, inquiring
as to “any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who
are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.” 88 Both Dubois
and Whitmore worked in the same OSHA department, held nearly identical
positions, and were engaged in similar inappropriate workplace behavior. 89 The
administrative judge contrarily concluded that no meaningful comparison could
be made regarding the different treatment solely because Whitmore was the
instigator.90
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower court and
refused to read the similarly situated test “so narrowly as to require virtual
identity” on the issue of similarly situated non-whistleblowers.91 The court
believed such a strict interpretation “effectively reads the [similarly situated test]
out of our precedent.” 92 Echoing Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Olech, the
Whitmore court admonished the test’s strict interpretation by noting “[o]ne can
always identify characteristics that differ between two persons to show that their
positions are not ‘nearly identical,’ or to distinguish their conduct in some
fashion.”93
Conversely, the Eastern District Court of New York in Payne v. Huntington
Free School District reached the opposite holding for the governing school board
on an equally narrow interpretation of the similarly situated test. 94 In Payne, a
part-time school teacher, who happened to be married to the school
superintendent, initiated a class of one suit when she was terminated from her
position.95 With no guidance, the court employed a very strict view of the
similarly situated test and used the husband’s status as a superintendent to
distinguish all other comparators offered by the school teacher. 96 No one else in

85.
86.
antics).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1357.
See id. at 1358−60 (noting instances such as denying paid leave, cyber-bullying, and other in-office
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1372.
Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1373.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
See infra Part II.B (discussing Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion); Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1373.
Payne v. Huntington Free Sch. Dist., 219 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 278–79 (arguing she was treated differently from other school teachers similarly situated).
Id. at 280.
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the district was a “superintendent’s wife” specifically, and the court considered
no other supervisory-subordinate relationships as similarly situated to the
claimant.97
Decisions like these illustrate the uphill battle plaintiffs face and allow future
courts to reach pre-determined results.98 Essentially, this “virtual identity” test
risks discouraging plaintiffs from bringing class of one claims and leaves them
without a chance in court. 99 Courts seem to prefer stopping frivolous litigation
over preserving meritorious claims in the class of one context.100 This preference
has prompted other hard and fast rules that attempt to take class of one claims out
of existence.101 As former Supreme Court Justice Stevens put it, “[e]ven if some
surgery were truly necessary to prevent governments from being forced to defend
a multitude of equal protection ‘class of one claims,’ the Court should use a
scalpel rather than a meat-axe.” 102 These decisions and scholarly commentary
illustrate how a narrow interpretation risks preventing plaintiffs from ever
succeeding on a class of one claim, because finding a similar comparator is
nearly impossible in unusual cases of obvious animus. 103
B. Varying Applications of the Similarly Situated Test do not Provide Proper
Guidance to Plaintiffs or to State Courts in Evaluating Class of One Claims
Despite the current trend in using a prima facie identical standard, many
circuits have employed their own version of the similarly situated test in a class
of one claim.104 First, the Olech Court clouded land use class of one claims by
leaving the similarly situated test undefined and failing to explain key words
pleaded by the landowner, such as “irrational” and “wholly arbitrary.” 105 A split

97. Id. at 278, 280.
98. See Farrell, supra note 41, at 413.
99. See id. (“By insisting that any prospective members of the comparison class not differ in any way
from the plaintiff, the court virtually foreordained the result that the plaintiff could not find any similarly
situated persons and thus her equal protection claim would fail.”).
100. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2160 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1059
(6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he presence of personal animosity should not turn an otherwise valid enforcement action
into a violation of the Constitution.”).
101. Matthew C. Juneau, Surgery or Butchery? Engquist v. Oregon, Class-of-One Equal Protection, and
the Shift to Categorical Treatment of Public Employees’ Constitutional Claims, 70 LA. L. REV. 313, 344 (2009)
(proving that Engquist’s per se rule banning class of one claims in the public employment context “required the
automatic dismissal of thirty-one of the thirty-six class of one claims examined”).
102. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158.
103. Since the Olech decision in 2000, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled against Plaintiffs on five out of six
occasions and has overturned the one judgment in favor of the plaintiff by applying its ‘nearly identical’
standard in all cases. LEXIS.
104. See infra Part II.B (providing case examples).
105. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (failing to define the test); Marcelle v.
Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Seventh Circuit Court in Marcelle v. Brown County Corporation 106 issued an
advisory opinion to try and resolve Olech’s ambiguity, but admitted that unless
the “role of motive and intent in class of one suits” is defined, 107 lower court
judges may never agree on “what those principles [concerning a class of one
claim] should be.” 108
Second, ambiguity causes courts to identify unnecessary distinctions between
comparators.109 For example, Judge Roger’s dissent in an Eighth Circuit female
prisoner equal protection case criticized the application of the similarly situated
test for fixating on irrelevancies such as the dimensions of the two prison
facilities.110 In the land use context, one scholar notes how difficult it is to
“compare the resulting apples and oranges” when applying the current similarly
situated tests against landowners. 111 “Every parcel is unique. Every owner’s
circumstances are different”—resulting in courts applying the test in highly
unpredictable ways.112 While courts recognize that class of one claims often
require “a comprehensive and largely subjective canvassing of all possible
relevant factors”113 when pinpointing differential treatment, a uniformly applied
test in obvious animus cases is necessary to avoid confusion and disagreements
among Circuit Courts.114
The fact-intensiveness of each case makes it seemingly impossible for courts
to apply a test suitable for each situation, but this is not ordinarily the case when
the facts reveal the clearest examples of government favoritism. 115 Therefore, it is
possible that a specific and detailed account of the test, its preferred factors, and
how courts apply them would better provide guidance for class of one judges and
plaintiffs when conducting a similarly situated analysis. 116

106. Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 917.
107. Id. at 900.
108. Id. at 891 (Posner, J.).
109. See generally Ernest Lidge III, Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 856 (2002) (outlining the effort put into identifying irrelevant
distinctions in employment cases).
110. Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corrs. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 954 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
111. Symposium, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
493, 507 (2007).
112. Little v. City of Oakland, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13633, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2000).
113. Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2004).
114. Joseph Cole, The Almighty Discretionary Power of State Officials Trumps the Equal Protection
Clause?, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 669, 678 (2010).
115. Symposium, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
493, 507 (2007).
116. See Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 990 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the necessity of a specific
and detailed account of similarly situated comparators in class of one cases).
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IV. NEW PROPOSAL
This Comment proposes a sliding scale test to relax the similarly situated test
for plaintiffs when the government actor’s decision was motivated by illegitimate
animus or subjective ill-will.117 The first section introduces the proposal and its
component parts.118 The second section explains why courts should adopt this
proposal in cases of clear government animus.119 Finally, the third section
examines the proposal’s potential effectiveness in practice. 120
A. Sliding Scale Test
First, the plaintiff must identify one or more comparators and provide actual
evidence of the government actor’s arbitrary treatment.121 Once the plaintiff
satisfies these prerequisites, courts should then apply the sliding scale test by
using certain factors to weigh (1) the degree of similarity offered by the class of
one plaintiff against (2) the government actor’s motivation for their decision.122 If
a government actor elicits clear animus against the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s burden
to show comparators similarly situated lowers significantly. 123 This section
addresses the two parts in more detail. 124
1. Degree of Similarity
To utilize the test, the class of one equal protection claimant who is subjected
to a municipal citation or government action125 must identify others in an
arguably similar situation who the government treated differently. 126 The
plaintiff’s prerequisite to name comparators remains the same,127 but in
evaluating similarity between the plaintiff and alleged comparators, courts may
consider these non-exhaustive factors: (1) the project’s location; (2) planned use;

117. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
118. See infra Part IV.A.1–2 (introducing the factors courts should consider when weighing the degree of
similarity against the government’s clear evidence of animus).
119. See infra Part IV.B (discussing why the proposal is necessary).
120. See infra Part IV.C (using a series of case examples and hypotheticals).
121. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
122. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
123. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
124. See infra Part IV.A.1–2 (introducing the factors courts should consider when weighing the degree of
similarity against the government’s clear evidence of animus).
125. Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that a party must have
been on the receiving end of a municipal citation or government action to have standing to classify as a proper
class of one plaintiff).
126. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9266, at *45–46 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 2002).
127. See Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 656 F. Supp. 2d 662, 692 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (implying that it is the
plaintiff’s and not the court’s job to identify comparators).
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(3) impact on the community; (4) zoning designation; (5) previous uses; (6)
government’s treatment of permit applications; and (7) whether the project exists
in a comparable community plan. 128
2. Actual Evidence of Government Animus
The class of one plaintiff must always provide explicit or implicit evidence
that a Government actor 129 displayed illegitimate animosity or subjective ill-will
towards the plaintiff in treating him differently from comparators similarly
situated.130 Evidence of third-party intermeddling in plaintiff’s affairs or animus
directed towards him is irrelevant. 131 In class of one claims, the following factors
can serve as evidence whether a government actor’s illegitimate animosity or
subjective ill-will towards a plaintiff is actually present: (1) evidence of
discrimination; (2) harassment; (3) readily-apparent hostility, malice,
vindictiveness, or malignant animosity; (4) whether a pattern or continuousness
of unjustified conduct exists; and (5) the government’s purpose behind or
motivation for their decision. 132
B. Why the Sliding Scale Test is Necessary
This proposal is justified for multiple reasons: First, too strict a test in class
of one claims takes the focus of the Equal Protection Clause away from
protecting individual rights. 133 Even one court from the stringent Eleventh Circuit
notices that defining similarly situated too narrowly may leave plaintiffs with no
ground to stand on. 134 The proposed test introduces a broader and more relaxed
standard that reduces overzealous local officials keeping aggrieved persons from
128. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test); see also Pappas v. Town of Enfield, 18 F. Supp. 3d
164, 182 (D. Conn. 2014) (listing “lot size, density of buildings, types of housing, temporal density,” and even
the composition of the decision-making board themselves as other potential factors; and Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Cty. Com., 488 U.S. 336, 340 n.3 (1989) (using “topography, location, development, mineral
content,” and distance from contiguous parcels as potential identifiers).
129. The City, County, or a person directly involved in the City or County’s decision-making, approval,
or denial process.
130. Contra E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding illegitimate
animosity or subjective ill-will does not include different treatment standing alone); see also Rossi v. W. Haven
Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (D. Conn. 2005) (“decisions that are imprudent, ill-advised, or even
incorrect may still be rational”).
131. See Kennie v. Nat. Res. Dep’t, 451 Mass. 754, 762 (2008) (refusing to consider evidence of a thirdparty who “interfered with, or attempted to interfere with, the plaintiffs’ right to use and improve their property
subject to governmental regulations that [were] fairly administered”).
132. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test); cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (identifying certain indicators of actual government misconduct).
133. See Farrell, supra note 41, at 379 (indicating that “the Fourteenth Amendment itself provides that no
state shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws”).
134. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]oo narrow a definition of
similarly situated could exclude from the zone of equal protection those who are plainly treated disparately and
without a rational basis.”).
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seeking a proper remedy in federal court.135
Second, there is a need to “provide lower federal and state courts guidance
concerning when class of one comparators, landowners, or development projects
are ‘similarly situated’” yet are subject of illegitimate animus or subjective illwill.136 A sliding scale test would resolve the ambiguity of Olech because it
formulates a standard that is “both consistent with Olech and operable.” 137 A
sliding scale test better allows courts to decide whether the government’s
differential treatment resulted from legitimate or illegitimate considerations
because it offers a “comprehensive canvassing of all possible relevant factors.”138
The similarly situated prong is a “malleable concept”, and a sliding scale test that
considers spelled-out factors makes class of one disputes easier for courts to
grapple with. 139 Besides uncertainty, current ambiguity in the law leaves an
undefined similarly situated test that threatens the local government authority. 140
A sliding scale test limits the risk of overstepping local law decision-making and
policy because it only affects government decisions motivated by animus or illwill directed at the plaintiff. 141 If the government would have decided against the
plaintiff’s application or request regardless of any animus, then animus alone
would not frame the action. 142 “Ill will must be the sole cause of the complained
action.”143
As gatekeepers of the law, judges will be the arbiters of applying this test at
the summary judgment stage, while the fact-finder will decide on the merits
thereafter.144 A current trend interprets Olech to relax the burden on a plaintiff’s
complaint at the pleading stage, yet summary judgment determinations remain at
a high burden. 145 Therefore, courts would apply the sliding scale test at the
135. Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If the power of government is brought to
bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state or local official harbors a malignant animosity
toward him, the individual ought to have a remedy in federal court.”).
136. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Dibbs v. Hillsborough Cty., 625 F. App’x 515 (2015) (No. 15-10152),
2016 WL 1056616.
137. Cf. Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2012) (reinforcing Judge Posner’s
opinion that, despite some support, current tests are inconsistent with the Olech decision and are inoperable).
138. Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Looking only at one
individual, however, there is no way to know whether the difference in treatment was occasioned by legitimate
or illegitimate considerations without a comprehensive . . . canvassing of all possible relevant factors.”).
139. Contra Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Discourse, and
Judicial Function in Class-Of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L. REV. 197, 211 (2013) (arguing in
support of a malleable similarly situated test that leaves each court to define their own standard). This
Comment, however, suggests a malleable test with a pre-defined standard.
140. Gehan, supra note 36.
141. See infra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
142. Giaimo, supra note 57, at 343.
143. Id.
144. Cf. Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 656 F. Supp. 2d 662, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (implying that it is the
plaintiff’s and not the court’s job to identify comparators).
145. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 170 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the Court
applied too strict a standard); Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing the
Willowbrook decision did not require that the “plaintiff identify in the complaint specific instances where others
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summary judgment stage to reduce the strict burden imposed by the current
similarly situated test. 146 The test’s narrow application at the summary judgment
stage should weed out the litigious claims while lifting the burden on state and
local officials.147 Putting this sliding scale test through a test suite of case
examples and hypotheticals is the best method to evaluate the test’s
effectiveness.148
C. Test Suite
A device originally used in computer programming, a test suite in the law
assesses a prescriptive legal proposal, rule, or guideline for its soundness. 149
Committing this sliding scale test to a test suite is useful because it not only
identifies potential real-life issues the test will address, but it also confirms the
value of the proposal to the legal community. 150 The following sections pose
diverse hypotheticals or embody case precedent meant to demonstrate both how
the test operates and what potential results the test yields. 151 These situations
identify the proposal’s application in pleading and practice to determine when its
use is appropriate. 152 The examples provided do not resolve every conceivable
scenario, but comprehensively address situations and issues plausible in land use
context of class of one equal protection claims. 153
1. Government Uses Proper Discretion154
Some recognize that class of one claims must be highly scrutinized to avoid
constitutionalizing “what are essentially issues of local law and policy.” 155 The
proposed test protects this principle because it does not apply to traditional class
have been treated differently for the purposes of equal protection” and that such evidentiary hurdles “should not
defeat [a] claim at the pleading stage”) (citing DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 2003)); Williams
v. Riley, 275 F. App’x 385, 390 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying the minimal showing for claimant convict who
complained of correctional officer misconduct, the court held plaintiff need only “show he has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated”).
146. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
147. Farrell, supra note 41, at 377 (“Determining ‘all relevant aspects’ of similar situations usually
depends on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If we
require defendants to wait until summary judgment, we burden local and state officials with the regular prospect
of ‘fishing expeditions’ and meritless suits.”).
148. See generally Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions - A Research
Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595 (1999) (discussing how to use a test suite).
149. Id. at 599.
150. Id. at 600.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 595 (identifying what issues need to be tested and whether the doctrine makes sense).
153. Id. at 600.
154. The following hypothetical is based on the facts of Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306
(11th Cir. 2006).
155. Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1996).

167

2018 / Similarly Situated Test in Cases of Obvious Government Animus
of one claims involving a government’s proper use of discretion. 156 Imagine for
instance that Elaine is looking to get tentative approval from her City’s planning
commission to build a 100-unit apartment complex on a ten acre plot of land. 157
The planning commission tables Elaine’s application twice, and eventually
denies her proposal on the third attempt because the proposed apartment complex
violates City density requirements. 158 Elaine offers two other development
projects as comparators, both of which had their applications approved: a
commercial development and a 20-unit apartment that satisfies city density
requirements.159
Elaine’s proffered comparators are not similarly situated under any level of
scrutiny because the commercial development is not a residential project, and the
20-unit apartment project has no issues meeting City density requirements. 160 The
planning commission’s decision was rational because the commission used
appropriate zoning factors to deny Elaine’s proposal; a class of one complaint
that identifies a project treated differently, alone, is not enough. 161 Thus, the
proposed test is not applicable here because no actual evidence supports a
finding of illegitimate animus or subjective ill will. 162 This result leaves
precedent that applies the test rigorously against the plaintiff intact because it is
nonsensical to lower the plaintiff’s burden when local governments use their
discretion properly. 163
2. Government Uses Improper Discretion164
In Swanson v. City of Chetek, Karl Swanson purchased a home next door to
the mayor of Chetek and, with a permit, built a three-foot fence along the

156. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test).
157. See generally Campbell, 434 F.3d at 1310 (juxtaposing the situation, wherein plaintiffs sought to
build 180 units on a ten-acre plot of land).
158. See generally id. at 1310–11 (claiming City density requirements permitted only 100 units on a tenacre plot of land).
159. See generally id. at 1311–12 (proffering eight comparators).
160. See generally id. at 1314–17 (citing here the project’s use, attempts at receiving tentative approval,
and the land’s density as important factors in dismissing Campbell’s comparators).
161. See generally id. (stating the alleged comparators were not similarly situated because of different
zoning factors); E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Different treatment of
dissimilarly situated persons does not violate the equal protection clause.”).
162. Cf. Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (“plaintiff must present
evidence the defendant deliberately sought to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a
personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s position” . . . going beyond personal hostility to the
plaintiff).
163. Cf. Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (supporting traditional equal protection
analysis where a defendant’s arbitrary actions, “quite apart from the [defendant’s] subjective motivation, are
sufficient to state a claim”).
164. The following hypothetical is based on the facts of Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780 (7th
Cir. 2013).
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property line and the front street.165 The mayor resented the Swansons building
this fence and initiated an orchestrated campaign of harassment against
Swanson.166 This “campaign” included admonishing the building inspector for
issuing the Swansons a remodeling permit, trespassing onto the Swansons’
property, and telling the fence constructors that “the Swanson[s] . . . were drug
dealers and unlikely to pay for the work provided.” 167 Further, it was apparent the
Mayor used his power and influence to coerce the building inspector into
delaying the grant of Swanson’s fence permit. 168 The mayor was also responsible
for prosecuting Swanson in the City’s municipal court for violating the five-foot
property line setback requirement. 169 Swanson filed a class of one equal
protection claim against the mayor and identified his other neighbor, Michele
Eberle, as a comparator. 170 Eberle constructed a fence along the Swanson-Eberle
property line without a permit and was not sued for its removal. 171 The magistrate
judge found Eberle’s situation dissimilar and denied Swanson’s claim because:
(1) Swanson failed to include fence dimensions in his complaint, and (2) Eberle’s
situation included only a boundary fence and no front fence. 172
Under this scenario, the proposed test would be triggered because Swanson
has met his burden to indicate comparators and there is actual evidence of
illegitimate animus against the landowner—not just a general allegation he was
treated differently from Eberle. 173 The proposed test is appropriate here for two
reasons: first, a clear demonstration of overt hostility makes it “oddly formalistic
to demand a near identical, one-to-one comparison to prove the [government
actor’s] readily-apparent hostility.”174 Plaintiffs who fail to plead sufficient facts
that show actual government animus already risk dismissal or a strict application
of the similarly situated test; and this standard will continue to preserve
government authority. 175 In this instance, however, the sliding scale test would
provide resolve for Swanson by allowing a judge to canvass Swanson’s
comparators leniently when weighed against the Mayor’s clearly unjustified
conduct.176
This improved standard is consistent with Olech, operable, and fair to
165. Id. at 781.
166. Id. at 781–82.
167. Id. at 782.
168. Id.
169. Swanson, 719 F.3d at 782.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 785 (determining a specific harasser is identified, a motive is present, and the mayor’s actions
“appear illegitimate on their face”).
174. Swanson, 719 F.3d at 785.
175. Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 548 (7th Cir. 2008) (exemplifying a zoning
decision denying developers claim at the pleading stage).
176. Cf. Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (suggesting the degree of
proffered similarity should depend on the context of each case).
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plaintiffs because it leaves local government decision-making authority intact
without precluding a plaintiff’s opportunity for remedy. 177 Second, courts cannot
extend the reaches of this test or be overbroad with its application because it is
narrowly applied to cases of obvious animus. 178 Courts faced with Swanson’s
situation can avoid disagreement and Olech’s ambiguity by applying a fact
intensive, defined standard that examines factors on a case-by-case basis.179
3. Questionable Use of Government Decision-Making Authority180
Under current tests, some courts have difficulty deciding whether a plaintiff’s
pleadings demonstrate slight irrationality in the government’s actions or obvious
animus.181 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Development
Corporation tried to shed light on whether an invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor in the government’s decision. 182 The court considered
factors such as: “[t]he historical background of the decision,” the government’s
administrative history represented in its meetings and reports, and departures
from the normal procedural and substantive sequence used by the decisionmaking body. 183 Although Village of Arlington concerned a suspect class, the
factors seemingly would translate to a class of one suit without opening the
floodgates to litigation because the inquiry is largely the same. 184 The proposed
test effectuates this purpose by refining the factors to limit judicial intervention
and constitutionalizing run of the mill land use decisions. 185
Consider Frank and Chase, two neighboring property owners.186 The

177. Cf. Farrell, supra note 41, at 413 (arguing a relaxed standard will not preclude a plaintiff’s
opportunity for an equal protection remedy).
178. See supra Part IV.A.2 (applying the sliding scale test only in cases of actual, improper discretion).
179. See Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1214 (“Inevitably, the degree to which others are viewed as similarly
situated depends substantially on the facts and context of the case . . . This is the key to understanding Olech.”).
180. The following hypothetical tracks the issues contemplated in Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537
(2007).
181. See, e.g., Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (expressing uncertainty
with how to consider the government’s motive); Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 454 (7th Cir.
2002) (finding the plaintiff’s allegations of ill will insufficient); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 275 F.3d 579, 587
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting plaintiffs must establish an obvious illegitimate animus); see also Lunini v. Grayeb, 395
F.3d 761, 767–768 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting questions of material fact surrounding the officer’s motivations for
arresting the plaintiff); McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the lack of a
precise formula to use).
182. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
183. Id.
184. Horstensia S. Carreira, Protecting the “Class of One”, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 331, 359
(2001).
185. Id. at 359–60 (“If these factors are “tightened-up” when applied to non-suspect classifications,
fewer reasons exist to fear an overwhelming wave of judicial intervention on behalf of individuals . . . These
requirements especially protect typical one-shot local government decisions and highly specific zoning
decisions from egregious judicial intervention.”).
186. See generally Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 537 (2007) (involving a federal Bivens and RICO
actions that fielded similar issues of government conduct, instead of a class of one claim).
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previous owner of Frank’s property and the previous owner of Chase’s property
each granted easements to the City to access nearby City-owned property.187
Frank’s easement was recorded when he purchased the property, but Chase’s was
not.188 Both Frank and Chase had previously petitioned their City Council for
Special Recreation Use Permits that would allow them to host cattle drives on the
City’s land.189 The City Council granted both requires, but Chase’s requests were
met with difficulty, hard bargaining, coercion, and pressure from the Government
to persuade Chase to re-grant his easement. 190 When Chase refused, the City
Council later cancelled his permit. 191
If Chase, in his class of one suit, claims illegitimate animus because
“defendants simply demanded too much and went too far,” then the court’s
discretion will decide whether the prerequisites are satisfied to apply the
proposed test. 192 Assume for a moment that a court finds illegitimate animus and
applies the proposed test based on this evidence: the government now has a
defined standard to apply that would more leniently compare the plaintiff’s
comparators against the weight of the government’s animus. 193
This proposal replaces the ambiguity of a “too much” standard for a more
reliable “what for” standard. 194 If, however, Chase does not suggest the
Government’s actions were illegitimate, 195 or the court makes an initial
determination that the Government executed its discretion properly, then the

187. See generally id. (“The previous owner [of Robbins’s property] granted the United States an
easement to use and maintain a road running through the ranch to federal land in return for a right-of-way to
maintain a section of road running across federal land to otherwise isolated parts of the ranch.”).
188. See generally id. (implying the Bureau had hoped Robins would regrant the easement to them).
189. See generally id. (noting Robins held cattle drives on his land).
190. See generally id. at 538, 568 (dealing with Robbins’s unfavorable agency actions against him,
including “a 1995 cancellation of the right-of-way given to Robbins’s predecessor in return for the
Government’s unrecorded easement, a 1995 decision to reduce the [permit] from five years to one, the [special
use permit]’s termination and a grazing permit’s revocation,” and a “seven-year campaign of harassment [that]
had a devastating impact on Robbins’ business”).
191. See generally Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 568–69 (noting the Government cancelled Robbins’ permit after
he refused to provide an easement to the Government).
192. See generally id. at 539, 557 (contrasting the present hypothetical because Robbins did not claim
illegitimate animus).
193. Id. at 539 (illustrating that even if a court finds illegitimate animus, it may very well use the factors
to conclude that the “[government was] within their rights to make it plain that [owners]’s willingness to give an
easement would determine how complaisant they would be about his trespasses on public land”). This less-than
compelling evidence of animus would raise the amount of proof required for similarly situated comparators,
much like traditional class of one cases. The fact that the City treated Frank differently in the application
process might defeat Chase’s claim. See also id. at 573 (concluding contrarily that if illegitimate animus is
overwhelmingly demonstrated by “trespasses to [owner]’s property, vindictive cancellations of his rights to
access federal land, and unjustified or selective enforcement actions,” then Chase’s differential application
experience would likely not defeat his claim).
194. Cf. id. at 556–57 (noting if the Bureau’s conduct clearly serves a legitimate purpose, then “[t]he
‘what for’ question already has an answer in terms of lawful conduct.” Conversely, if the Bureau’s conduct is
clearly illegitimate, the proposed test gives courts a roadmap to an answer rather than applying guesswork as to
what constitutes going “too far”).
195. See generally id. at 539 (following the situation posed in Wilkie).
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proposed test does not apply.196 Here, this outcome makes sense because not
every case will mirror the specific facts and allegations of this hypothetical. 197
4. When Should “Similarly Situated” Mean Similar or Identical?198
In view of varying precedent, plaintiffs that are the subject of actual
government animus should be apprised of what evidentiary threshold will be
applied when undergoing a similarly situated analysis. 199 The Seventh Circuit
allows a more lenient demonstration of facts, yet the Eleventh Circuit imposes a
rigorous threshold on some plaintiffs who plead an overabundance of facts. 200
To illustrate the issue, consider these facts: Gristle Industries operates a
chicken rendering plant and holds a permit to dump “cleansed” waste onto the
company’s own land. 201 Assume Gristle can prove that the City’s mayor, who
owns neighboring land adjacent the plant, used clear and unjustified personal
animus to conspire with the Environmental Protection District (EPD) to suspend
Gritsle’s dumping permit. 202 Gristle files a class of one claim and points to
Ameri-Chick Poultry, a competing chicken rendering plant, as a comparator
allowed to keep its permit and that the City did not treat disparately. 203 Aware of
the relaxed threshold the proposed test offers in this situation, counsel for Gristle
details in the complaint Ameri-Chick’s use of the land to dump waste, the similar
impact Gristle’s permit has on the community, the zoning designation, and the
government’s history in handing out permits to the two facilities. 204 The judge
applies the proposed test and denies Ameri-Chick’s motion for summary
judgment, leaving the jury to resolve the issue. 205
The above hypothetical is a good example of how the proposed test may have
changed the result in Griffin Industries.206 The plaintiff in Griffin Industries filed

196. See supra Part IV.B.1 (following the realm of the facts posed in Campbell).
197. See supra Part IV.B.2 (the proposed test operates on a very fact intensive, case by case basis).
198. The following hypothetical is based on Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007)
with modified facts to demonstrate a point.
199. See supra Part III.B (arguing factors provide plaintiffs better guidance).
200. Compare Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding a near one-to-one
comparison is unnecessary when clear illegitimate animus exists), with Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1205
(imposing the prima facie identical standard on plaintiff who had pleaded an abundance of facts).
201. See generally Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1194–95 (issuing Griffin a LAS permit to allow the
company to spray waste onto his land).
202. See id. at 1196 (arguing oppositely that although the mayor did own land next to the plant, the court
did not think the mayor’s influence, pressure, and alleged conspiracy with the EPD was enough to indicate
illegitimate animus).
203. See generally id. at 1197 (the plaintiff alleged a business competitor did not suffer the same conduct
the plaintiff’s plant did).
204. See id. at 1206 (posing a different scenario, where Griffin pointed to the similar water pollution
issues, citizen complaints, and size of the facilities).
205. See generally Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d 1189 (dismissing Griffin’s suit at the pleading stage).
206. See Farrell, supra note 41, at 413 (a plaintiff would likely receive more favorable treatment under a
relaxed similarly situated analysis).
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a 41-page complaint and 21 exhibits detailing how it was similarly situated to the
defendant’s chicken rendering plant. 207 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the prima facie identical threshold, and felt the plaintiff’s entire 41-page
complaint was conclusory. 208 In finding not one scintilla of evidence indicating
similarly situated comparators, it is possible the plaintiff was entirely without a
clue on what factual evidence to plead; 209 or how much evidence was proper to
meet a prima facie identical threshold. 210 Certainly, a look through conflicting
precedent would not have been helpful. 211 Courts continually struggle “with what
a plaintiff must plead, and ultimately show, to prevail” on the test. 212 Further, a
prima facie identical threshold in this scenario may cause plaintiffs to plead more
than is necessary. 213 The proposed test at least puts plaintiffs on notice of the
threshold when clear government animus is present, and allows them to collect
proper evidence before involving the courts. 214
5. Actual Evidence of Animus by an Unaffiliated Government Actor215
Some cases involve third-party government animus where there is no direct
influence over the local governing body. 216 Consider a group of four lakeside
property owners, each seeking a permit from their town’s conservation
commission to “construct a pier and dock off the waterfront edge of their
property.” 217 As required by the town’s commission, any person seeking such
permit must provide the town’s shellfish constable, who is not a member of the
commission, “with data detailing the size and frequency distributions for
shellfish on the proposed site.”218 The constable tells one property owner, Ryan,
that he will “do whatever it takes to prevent a dock” from being built in that
area.219 As a surveyor conducts shellfish surveys, the constable purchases and
207. Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1205.
208. Id. at 1205–06.
209. Cf. id. at 1205 (suggesting plaintiff’s complaint is one that omits key factual details proper for a
similarly situated analysis).
210. See id. at 1205–06 (admonishing Griffin, even after imposing the highest threshold possible on the
company, for including too much detail in the complaint).
211. Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 918 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting, noting the
“unsettled state of the law”).
212. Id. at 906 (Wood, J., dissenting).
213. See Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1205–06 (failing the similarly situated burden because the
overabundance of factual detail caused the court to find numerous contradictions in his complaint).
214. See supra Part I (introducing the proposed test); Part IV.A (outlining potential factors used in a
similarly situated analysis).
215. The following hypothetical is based on the facts of Kennie v. Natural Res. Dep’t, 451 Mass. 754
(2008).
216. See generally id. at 757 (involving a town constable who sent fraudulent survey results to the City’s
planning commission).
217. See id. at 755 (noting plaintiff similarly sought a permit to construct a dock).
218. Id. at 756.
219. See id. at 757 (citing constable’s statement to plaintiff that he was “mandated to do whatever it takes
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plants a significant amount of shellfish at the waterfront edge of Ryan’s
property.220 The conservation commission grants building permits to all property
owners except Ryan because his results exceed permissible shellfish quantity
levels.221
The proposed test does not apply here because Ryan can easily indicate
similarly situated comparators treated differently; but there is no actual evidence
to support a finding that the conservation commission acted with illegitimate
animus or subjective ill-will.222 Despite the constable’s third-party intermeddling,
the commission executes its discretion properly because it is following protocol
to grant permits.223
This result relieves any fear of constitutionalizing claims that are matters of
local discretion because it provides no outlet for plaintiffs that are the subject of
unlucky circumstances; the standard will remain rigorously applied against the
plaintiff.224 This hypothetical differs from Swanson because the mayor there had
direct influential authority over the inspector’s decision to deny issuance of a
fence permit.225 Additionally, Ryan has remedies aside from a class of one equal
protection claim. 226
6. Government’s Rational Basis a Pretext for an Impermissible Motive227
Certain cases have challenged government land use decision, which on their
face appear like a proper exercise of discretion, but in actuality are objectively
false or are based upon improper motive. 228 The proposed test may provide

to prevent docks from being built in the area”).
220. See generally Kennie, 451 Mass. at 757 (claiming the constable planted the shellfish in water).
221. See generally id. at 758 (noting the plaintiffs withdrew their application ahead of time because they
knew the shellfish would exceed permissible levels).
222. See id. at 762 (arguing plaintiffs “do not contest the constitutionality of the regulatory wetlands
protection scheme administered by the commission or indeed any actions by the commission - which is not a
defendant”).
223. Id.
224. Gehan, supra note 36.
225. See supra Part IV.B.2 (recall that the mayor used his power and status to influence the issuance of a
fence permit, whereas the constable in this hypothetical has no power of authority over the commission).
226. See Kennie, 451 Mass. at 762 (the plaintiffs’ could enforce “(1) [their] protected right to seek a
permit from the commission, whether or not they had an entitlement to the order they sought; [or] (2) if, as t he
plaintiffs assert, Marcy’s words and subsequent actions were an attempt to cause the commission to act on
tainted evidence, he himself would have interfered with, or attempted to interfere with, [their] right to use and
improve their property subject to governmental regulations that are fairly administered.”).
227. The following example considers the facts of MetroPCS Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. C
02-3442 PJH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43985 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006).
228. E.g., id. at *53 (stating that even if the defendant showed a rational basis for its conduct, the
plaintiff could prevail if it “show[ed] that the [defendant’s] rational basis [was] a pretext for an ‘impermissible
motive.’”); Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n equal protection
plaintiff may show pretext by creating a triable issue of fact that either: (1) the proffered rational basis was
objectively false; or (2) the defendant actually acted based on an improper motive.”); see also Patel v. Penman,
103 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that pretext might be shown if the city was “using its code
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judges guidance in this otherwise unclear area of law because courts have not
“set forth the exclusive means through which to prove pretext.” 229
In MetroPCS Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, MetroPCS sought a
conditional use permit to build a wireless antenna facility. 230 The San Francisco
Planning Condition originally granted MetroPCS the conditional use permit but
overturned their own decision on appeal. 231 The court ruled for the City on its
earlier summary judgment motion to deny MetroPCS’s class of one claim;
however, MetroPCS then provided evidence to show that the Commission’s
‘rational decision’ to uphold the appeal was a pretext for an impermissible
motive.232
The proposed test applies here if a judge, based on plaintiff’s newly
suggested evidence for impermissible motive, makes an initial determination that
the San Francisco Planning Commission has exhibited illegitimate animus or
subjective ill-will.233 Since the judge in MetroPCS already upheld the City’s
motion for summary judgment, the test for pretext gives plaintiffs new life in
their class of one pursuit. 234 If the basis for the judge’s earlier decision was
couched in insufficient evidence of identical comparators, then the proposed test
gives plaintiffs a second opportunity at leniency in identifying those
comparators.235
The proposed test does not supplant the test for pretext, but allows judges to
use the evidence offered by plaintiffs proving pretext in deciding to relax the
similarly situated test where evidence of illegitimate animus or subjective ill-will
enforcement process not to enforce compliance with the codes but rather to drive . . . downtown motels out of
business”); Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1327 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding “a triable issue of fact as to
whether the [city’s] asserted rationale of directing efforts to enforce the housing code at high-crime areas was
merely a pretext” to reduce property values for the city to purchase them at a reduced rate); Lockary v. Kayfetz,
917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Although a water moratorium may be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest in controlling a water shortage” the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact regarding the “very
existence of a water shortage.”).
229. MetroPCS Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43985, at *54.
230. Id. at *2, *4, *6 (noting MetroPCS chose this location for the proposed facility because it fit their
needs to provide service to moderate to low-income customers; their original planned site above the Mars
Commercial Building was denied because of community opposition).
231. Id. at *11.
232. Id. at *56 (arguing in support of the contention that these findings were a pretext, MetroPCS
introduced the following evidence: “photographs of the proposed antennas that purportedly belie the Board’s
findings[;] . . . the location preference system and Ms. Estes’ testimony as proof of the Board’s purportedly
“contradictory” findings as to other carriers’ cell sites[;] . . . [testimony from] the City’s own witness, Mr.
Badiner, . . . that he had previously come to the opposite conclusion from the Board as to some of the findings
upon which the Board’s decision was based, as did Supervisor Daly”; Metro PCS’s indication of “no evidence”
as to the Board’s remaining findings; and the “comments of numerous supervisors at the hearing on the appeal
of the Planning Commission’s grant of MetroPCS’ CUP application, as proof that these comments demonstrate
‘animosity’ toward MetroPCS”).
233. See supra Part IV.A (instructing how to apply the proposed sliding scale test).
234. See MetroPCS Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43985, at *53–54 (ruling for the City on their motion
for summary judgment).
235. Id. at *60–61 (note that judge’s actual basis for his ruling included a determination that the San
Francisco Planning Commission exercised proper discretion of authority).
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is clear.236 MetroPCS clarifies that a judge would likely not find illegitimate
animus here, however, the proposed test operates on a case-by-case basis making
it useful in more complicated decisions. 237
V. CONCLUSION
Olech’s decision clouds the law governing class of one equal protection
claims, and multiple circuit courts are responding by applying their own varying
interpretations on the similarly situated test, what constitutes government animus,
and more.238 Addressing these issues in cases of obvious government animus is
necessary and practical to preserve the plaintiff’s chances of success in class of
one claims.239 Landowners, courts, and other potential plaintiffs need better
guidance on the constituencies of class of one claims and how courts might apply
them, so there is a fair canvassing of the Plaintiff’s evidence while maintaining
local government discretion and proper power of authority. 240 This is especially
true when animus is readily obvious, because “it seems redundant to require that
the plaintiff show disparate treatment in a near exact, one-to-one comparison to
another individual.”241
This proposed test resolves this issue by providing judges with an operable
standard that protects plaintiffs when local government interests exercise
illegitimate animus or subjective ill-will.242 Until a workable standard is created,
potential class of one plaintiffs should be wary of the uncertain and rigorous
system that lies before them. 243

236. See supra Part I (outlining the purpose of the proposed sliding scale test).
237. See, e.g., Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 946–947 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving a
question of pretext for malignant animosity where Executive of the Lahontan Governing Board and Squaw
Valley’s president were hostile towards one another. Squaw Valley proffered evidence including: the “[Board’s]
campaign of vengeance”; deliberate “embarrassment”; and the Board’s “perturbed” and “aggressive” actions
“during meetings and on the phone”).
238. See supra Part II.B (providing multiple interpretations of the similarly situated test); Marcelle v.
Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 912 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing plaintiff’s confusion proving illegitimate
animus).
239. Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (arguing a strict interpretation
may read these claims out of precedent).
240. Cf. Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 990 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting class of one plaintiffs need to
provide a “specific and detailed account” of comparators and must be able to do so in light of a state actor’s
broad “exercise [of] discretion to balance a number of legitimate considerations”).
241. Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013).
242. See supra Part IV (outlining the proposed sliding scale test).
243. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (supporting the contention
that the similarly situated requirement is rigorously applied against class of one plaintiffs).
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